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Abstract 
The UN Cluster approach came from the Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) commissioned by 
the UN in 2005. The intention of that review was to address apparent failures in the speed, quality and 
effectiveness of humanitarian responses and in addition the lack of any common basis for assessing 
and comparing levels of need. Levels and techniques of funding were also found to be inadequate. 
The Cluster Approach would identified lead organizations for typically 10 key areas or clusters such 
as Food and Nutrition, Water and Sanitation, Health, Emergency Shelter, Early Recovery and 
Reconstruction, IT Telecommunications, Logistics, Camp Management and Protection and Education 
(as happened in Pakistan after the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake). 
One of the case study areas used for the HRR was the West Darfur situation. And this paper re-visits 
that situation based on data collected there in June 2004 as part of testing of the Kestle Framework.  
The paper revisits the development and validation of that framework and then compares it to the 
Cluster Approach and suggests a way to move ahead by merging the framework into the Cluster 
Approach to produce an enhanced more robust approach. 
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1. The cluster approach  
The cluster approach operates at both a global level (before an emergency), by building up 
international capacities of human resources and assistance materials, and at a field level (during the 
emergency) by coordinating humanitarian agencies such as the United Nations, The Red Cross-Red  
Crescent, International Non Government Organisations and National Non Government Organisations 
(IASC, 2005). Thus a cluster is “a group comprising organizations and other stakeholders.  Each 
cluster has a designated lead, working in an area of humanitarian response in which gaps in response 
have been identified.” (OCHA, 2006). 
Cluster leads have been assigned the responsibility of ensuring that the specific cluster needs both 
before and during an emergency are firstly identified and subsequently met. In cluster terminology 
lead “will act as the provider of last resort.” In addition, the cluster approach sets out the lines of 
reporting, the development of technical capacity with the ultimate aim of partnerships. However, it 
does not give any assistance in exactly how this is to be achieved or even attempted but instead 
appears to rely on it’s organisational changes achieving these aims.   
2. The Kestle Framework 
The Kestle Framework (refer to figure 1 below) was developed from a grounded theoretical approach 
and has been tested in a range of remote commercial and humanitarian situations (Kestle, 2009). It has 
proven so far to be a robust and resilient tool that captures the added value of design management for 
such situations. The framework has 4 components that are as follows: 
Value Generation/Integration,  Knowledge Integration, Process Integration, Timely Decision Making. 
 
The definition of these terms is discussed later.  
Production oriented worldview :
’
- value stream
- process integration
- workflow
- waste minimisation
Lean design’ 
Sociological oriented worldview
- value generation
 - timely decision making
 ‘design methodology’ & 
‘creative/iterative design process’
- knowledge integration 
REMOTE SITES
- proximity to urban areas
- regulatory framework
- physical environment
- functional/aesthetic and social aims
- environmental impact/sensitivity
VALUE GENERATION
- client’s value criteria
- stakeholders’ value criteria
KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION
- specialist site knowledge
- IT for remote site coordination
PROCESS INTEGRATION
- logistics & site accessibility
- construction planning/methodology
- alternative procurement  strategies
- creativity and production interface
DECISION MAKING
- timely & critical 
- performance criteria
- environmental sustainability
- economic constraints
 
SYNTHESISTHEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
CONTEXT
 
Figure 1: Outline of the Kestle Framework 
But what is interesting is that part of the impetus for the cluster approach was the crisis in Western 
Darfur in and around 2004 which was also one of the key test situations for the Kestle Framework. 
Initially, the authors were intrigued that two quite different models could come from the same context 
but on further reflection it would appear that the Kestle Framework could be merged into the Cluster 
Approach to enhance and better achieve it’s humanitarian goals.  
 
3. The situation in West Darfur circa 2004 
Darfur is a large area of approximately 256,000 square kilometres, consisting of 3 states with an 
estimated population of 5 million people made up from a complex tribal mix. Large parts of Darfur 
are prone to drought, and desertification that intensifies demands on its more fertile lands, and water 
supplies.  In recent decades, areas of Darfur have been subject to sporadic inter-tribal clashes over the 
use of such resources 
From early 2003, fighting intensified in the region following the emergence of two armed groups, the 
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and later the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and the 
commencement by them of hostilities against the Government. Following a string of SLA victories in 
the first months of 2003, the Government sponsored a militia composed of a loose collection of 
fighters, apparently of Arab background, from the Darfur region (Commission on Human Rights, 
2004). This militia became known as the ‘Janjaweed’ or ‘men on horse back’. The humanitarian 
fallout of this situation in Darfur (and the border regions of Chad) was an estimated one million 
Internally Displaced Persons/People (IDPs) by May 2004 (compared with 250,000 in 
September 2003) with 570,000 of the IDP’s being in West Darfur. By July 2004, this had increased to 
601,096 based on camp population estimates from the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Such a large displacement of people impacts on the ‘host’ community. 
Scarcity of water, firewood and animal feed before the crisis inflamed tensions and fighting. Against 
such a back drop, UN Agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), worked 
to get aid into Darfur.  
4. Methodology 
The opportunity was taken to test the Kestle Framework in this extreme situation and the sense of the 
authors was that the framework may not work. Nonetheless, 17 middle/senior management and 
operational staff from UN Agencies and INGO’s based and working in El Geneina the provincial 
capital of West Darfur were interviewed over the two months of June and July 2004. The interviews 
were held in El Geneina during the evenings and curfew period that existed at the time. Hence, the 
comments and views of those interviewed were current. No special selection criteria was applied for 
the interviewees, other than that they were representative of active humanitarian aid agencies in the 
area. They were recognized as middle/senior management people within the aid community at that 
time and were available and willing to be interviewed.  
There were two parts to the interview. Part A comprised a three part question that related to the 
interviewees’ official responsibilities. The question sought to establish the main issues that arose 
during the project, from the interviewees’ perspective and the impacts that these issues may have had 
on the project and their individual roles.  
Part B of the interview focused on the four key factors of the Kestle Framework with questions aimed 
at establishing fit (or mis-fit) between the framework and the reality experienced by those 
interviewed. Subsequently, 8 of the 17 interviewees’ transcripts were used for part B. These 8 were 
the managers of the agencies, and as such knew the big picture objectives, the strategies being 
applied, and the desired outcomes. 
The interviews were taped recorded and transcripts taken from them for the following analysis. The 
semi structured interview questions used are included in Appendix A. 
5. Analysis of the key findings for part A 
The findings were reviewed and analysed under the following headings which were taken from a 
compiled review of the response in West Darfur completed by Minear that identified the following 
issues (Minear, 2004):  
The Management Framework and Approaches, Funding / Budgets, The Pre-planning Stage(s), The 
Operations Stage, Communications,  Human Resources 
5.1 The Management Framework and Approaches 
There appear to be significant gaps in the understanding of disaster management within the 
humanitarian aid community which is not unusual (Fitz-Gerald et al, 2002). Moreover, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) guide lines contained with their handbook are 
circumspect and state that “There is no single blueprint for refugee emergency management; each 
refugee emergency is unique. However, experience shows that emergencies tend to evolve according 
to certain recognizable and documented patterns.”  (UNHCR, 1999).  The Handbook works by setting 
up desired outcomes and then leaves it for the practitioner in the field to select the management 
processes required to achieve those outcomes. 
Thus, the present literature tends to be strong on objectives but weak on process. Moreover, it 
suggests that each disaster is different and that there perhaps is no single answer, or process. Hence 
the initial thinking that there would be no fit (or even a minimal fit) between the ‘experiences in the 
field’ and the Kestle Framework.  
The management approaches according to those interviewed depended on the particular agency. Their 
unanimous view was that the management approaches were modified to fit with the particular 
disaster. Fitz-Gerald at al comment that “The humanitarian aid community is a ‘slow follower’ in the 
adoption of management tools and techniques. In some ways this can be explained or defended on the 
basis that humanitarian aid is delivered in an environment where no two situations are the same. 
Consequently there is no single model that can be applied and the absence of effective lessons-learned 
mechanisms that ensure positive and negative experiences are addressed throughout all levels of the 
organisation encourages reinvention with each deployment.” 
The lack of one particular coordinating agency dedicated to the needs of the IDPs, and a lack of 
delegated authority (by the agencies in Khartoum) to make decisions ‘in the field’ was also identified 
by several as a significant barrier. 
5.2 Funding / Budgets 
Eight of the seventeen interviewees were actively associated with budgeting and were responsible for 
reporting and monitoring their activities relative to their budgets. This ranged from having an ‘annual 
budget’ from their agency, or requesting funds on an ongoing basis, to forecasting a year in advance. 
In almost all cases, funding was not available at the start of the emergency.  The interviewees also 
referred to the fact that for some of the agencies, Khartoum budgeted for all of the Darfur states’ 
needs. In a few cases, the interviewees were required to be a part of a reporting and monitoring 
system that was linked directly to a monthly Action Plan. 
5.3 The Pre-planning Stages  
The unanimous view of the interviewees was that whilst they knew of the emergency situation in 
West Darfur in a general sense. They neither knew the specifics nor the scope or magnitude of the 
emergency before going there. They were basically advised to “assess and fix it”.  The interviewees 
all noted that there was no real expectation of being briefed but that the briefings they did receive 
were of little relevance to the actual situation. Statistical information on IDP numbers, available 
resources and amenities varied and were therefore unreliable. “There was a complete lack of 
transportation, telecommunications, office equipment (phones, fax machines, email systems, 
photocopiers, paper et al) Medivac plan, technicians and laboratories when we arrived into Darfur” 
(interviewees 10,15,16). 
 The situation in Darfur basically evolved and personnel were in catch-up mode rather than being able 
to pre-plan months in advance. Curiously, the interviewees noted that the most useful information was 
gained from watching the news on television and from reading media articles, before going to Darfur, 
rather than from the agencies. The logistical pre-planning was almost impossible to organise given the 
lack of existing systems. In addition, there was the issue of the inaccessibility of the site from political 
and geographical perspectives with air transport being the only feasible mode of transportation. 
5.4 The Operations Stage 
There was unanimous agreement amongst the interviewees that the remoteness of the site seriously 
impacted on the project and their roles. There was a view that “remoteness was the enemy of the 
programme”. The distance between Khartoum and Darfur added to the problems in terms of getting 
supplies through intact, if at all. The only realistic and relatively reliable form of transportation 
involved relatively light planes, given there were no properly formed roads, only marginally formed 
airstrips and no formal airport facilities. However, according to the interviewees there was never any 
real certainty as to when the planes may arrive or leave, nor what resources would be on board. 
Materials not locally available would take 5 weeks from by road from Khartoum, were frequently 
looted, or were held up by floods that would wash out the roads/tracks.   
5.5 Communications 
There was consensus amongst the interviewees that the management of communications’ systems and 
processes were either non-existent initially, or were unreliable at best. As already noted air transport 
was the only feasible means of providing resources to the West Darfur site. The camps were 
inaccessible by vehicles. Darfur was not serviced by fibre optic cable nor satellite technology, so 
phones were the only form of telecommunication, in association with a Pulse mailing system.  
Reporting systems to HQ in Khartoum relied on a mailing system, and given the ever-changing nature 
of the emergency, reported information was quickly outdated,“20,000 IDPs could leave or arrive in 
any one week, so you try to systemise the information received from people in the field using simple 
report sheets that can be quickly upgraded so that you can monitor the changes in order to respond” 
(8) 
5.6 Human Resources 
The UN generally has a different management style compared to the INGOs. UN staff are usually 
professional career people following a particular career path and basically have to ‘play it safe’ to be 
promoted. This risk aversion was perceived in different ways by the interviewees.  
All of the Emergency Phase ‘needs analysis’ people were highly trained specialists in their field 
generally from around the world and usually with high levels of previous humanitarian emergency 
experience. There was consensus amongst the interviewees that there was a lack of trained and 
experienced people resources with institutional knowledge and an ability to draft up monitoring 
reports. On-the job training was regarded by a few of the interviewees, as appropriate, important and 
unavoidable. The appointment of compatible work personnel was considered more important than 
pre-training. 
Thus, from a management perspective the findings so far suggest a fragmented and highly uncertain 
set of overall outcomes, for the stakeholders and the clients (IDPs). All the interviewees, whilst being 
given some basic terms of reference, on appointment, from their particular agency appeared to be 
working in parallel rather than in an integrated manner. All seek to comply with agreed standards such 
as SPHERE but at the same time each agency has it’s own mandate. But there appeared to be 
agreement as expressed by interviewee 12 that  “ the whole thing is based on sustainability and 
durability. Have to ensure the protection of the IDPs  and that their return (to their township and 
land) is sustainable and not just a survival package. Have to give them the means to be self-
sustaining”.   
6. Analysis of the key findings for Part B 
Part B of the interview studied the presence (or otherwise) of the four key factors of the Kestle 
Framework with the aim of establishing fit (or mis-fit) between the framework and the reality 
experienced by those interviewed.  
The results were generally consistent and supported the suggested framework across all of the 17 
interviewees. Differences appeared to be due to varying levels of autonomy in the decision-making 
processes. The following key points were drawn from the interviews: 
Value Generation was singularly concerned with making a difference to the lives of the IDP’s which 
was evident in comments made in the interviews. The effectiveness, and therefore the value was 
measured by what was achieved, how many IDP’s were assisted and mortality and morbidity rates. It 
was also measured in terms of keeping a reliable, continuous supply line of food to the displaced 
people, making a difference to the living conditions, access to water and sanitation and being able to 
respond in a timely manner to recommendations and changes in the field. It was a key factor. 
Knowledge Integration was concerned with the gaps in the knowledge integration process. No-one 
wanted to “trespass” on others’ areas and there were issues where the planning did not align with the 
reality in the field. The impact of experts was mitigated by the rigidity of the systems involved and 
some consultants being unfamiliar with the UN systems in particular and the existence of both formal 
and informal systems of knowledge integration. In addition, the gaps in specialist knowledge, in terms 
of the experiences of the people in the field, versus those in the office - they were not always aligned 
and a more holistic approach was required. Finally, a working knowledge of the IDP’s cultural and 
value systems were needed which was not helped by the high turnover of staff and the lack of 
recorded knowledge. Hence, it was another key factor. 
Process Integration was concerned with understanding how the IDP’s perceive the assistance being 
provided and designing processes and systems accordingly. The need for accurate assessments as the 
basis for setting up these processes (such as the logistical pipeline and camp distributions) was seen as 
the key. The need for co-ordination at the camp level and relationship-building with the International, 
and IDP communities and knowing the other agencies’ plans all meant better facilitation. Moreover, 
more could be achieved by using the Sudanese people and their expertise. They had valuable 
connections and networks within the community. 
Timely Decision- Making was concerned with the centralization of decision making in Khartoum. 
Hence, decision making in the field was slow and prescriptive. There appeared to be a tiered system 
of decision-making. Consultative decisions were made between those on the ground from different 
organizations as part of the value generation mentioned earlier but the degree of that decision making 
was proportional to the degree of autonomy of the staff member. Some were given almost total 
autonomy in the ‘field’, and dedicated organisational finance personnel to work with. Others appeared 
to work with minimal autonomy and resources. 
This lack of consistency of decision – making and delegated authority, across the range of agencies, 
and the ever-changing personnel in the Field and offices, was challenging, frustrating and 
disorientating for a number of the respondents.  
 The level of fit between the 4 factors that make up the Kestle Framework and the responses from 
those in the field was encouraging given the extreme circumstances faced in West Darfur. The authors 
have gone on and successfully used this framework in other humanitarian situations (Potangaroa et al, 
2008). But by chance, West Darfur was also the context for the development of the Cluster Approach 
and hence the intriguing situation of two quite separate management frameworks emerging from 
essentially the same context.    
7. Comparison of the cluster approach and the Kestle 
Framework 
It is interesting to compare the two approaches which shows the organizational bias of the Cluster 
Approach and its lack of direction compared to the Kestle Framework (refer to table 1 below). 
Moreover, the Kestle Frame appears to offer a more sophisticated response then what is capable under 
a Cluster but the cluster is possibly more robust in larger organizational settings. 
Table 1: Comparison of the Cluster Approach and the Kestle Framework 
Cluster Approach Kestle Framework 
Organisational perspective Manager perspective 
Comparatively minimal direction 4 suggested areas for managers to review and monitor 
Funding made more accessible Funding linked to “value generation” but connected to 
the other 3 framework areas 
Responsive through removal of 
organizational blocks 
Responsive through all 4 framework areas 
Quality through reduction of duplication 
and closing of gaps 
Quality through focus on 4 key areas 
Accountability through “provider of last 
resort”. 
Accountable through  metrics associated with the 4 
framework areas 
 
8. The way forward? 
So what can be concluded and how could the effectiveness of humanitarian response be best served 
from these approaches?  It seems that both approaches have advantages and that perhaps a way 
forward is to merge the Kestle Framework into the 10 or so clusters. And for example the emergency 
shelter cluster would as shown in table 2 below and over time would grow and mature as the informal 
lessons in the field filter into the strategic planning away in the office.  
Table 2: The Merged Cluster and Framework. 
Kestle Framework Merged Emergency Shelter Cluster/Framework. 
Value Generation/ 
Integration 
How do you know or measure the effectiveness of shelter?  
What are the rules of thumb that can be applied?   
What and how do you get feed back from “clients”?  
In what ways are you are accountable? 
Knowledge Integration How is learning recorded and passed on to others?  
How can you improve this situation?  
How would such changes be implemented?  
Are their gaps in the specialist knowledge in shelter? 
Process Integration What methods or approaches do you employ to achieve your 
goals and fulfil your role?  
How have you tried to improve on this or the system?  
What role does HR play or could play (for example in staff 
training, skills and experience)? 
Timely Decision Making How are your decisions made?  
Is this decision making centralised or de-centralised?  
How are budgets maintained?  
How significant are sustainability issues in your role? 
 
9. Conclusion 
The suggestion to merge these two approaches has significant advantages at minimal to zero cost to 
those agencies leading each cluster. Over time and with successive applications will emerge a 
structured array of experiences and tools that will better equip future generations of humanitarian aid 
staff. But more importantly, will result in better outcomes for those receiving emergency assistance.   
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW QUESTION SHEET 
 
The objective of this research is to ascertain how projects operate in remote areas and how issues of 
“remoteness” are addressed and the recommendations that you would make particularly from a 
management perspective. These recommendations could be for the decision making both before and 
as work proceeds, the management framework, decision making, communications, HR or funding. 
This is achieved through the structured question set below. 
In your role and official capacity as …………………..  what is your involvement with the West 
Darfur situation and what is its relationship to your job description or TOR? Have your TOR relating 
to West Darfur changed in your time on the job?  
How much do you know or have been told of the West Darfur area and the situation there? How often 
have you been or get to West Darfur? 
What advice would you give to anyone about to be stationed in West Darfur? 
What in your view are the main issues for those stationed in West Darfur and what part (if any) do 
you believe they are the result of its remoteness?  
What conclusions and recommendations would you have for future projects?  
In terms of your involvement and understanding of the West Darfur project could you please 
comment on the following areas: 
Value Generation:   
How do you know or measure the effectiveness of your role as it relates to West Darfur? Are there 
any rules of thumb that you intuitively apply?  
What and how do you get feed back from “clients”?  
In what ways do you feel that you are accountable? 
Knowledge Integration:   
How is what you have learnt on West Darfur recorded and passed on to others?  
How are you or would you like to improve this situation?  
Would such changes or are changes related to your involvement in West Darfur easy to implement?  
Are their gaps in the specialist knowledge in the area in which you are involved for West Darfur? 
Process Integration:  
What methods or approaches do you employ to achieve your goals and fulfil your role?  
How have you tried to improve on this or the system?  
What role does HR play or could play (for example in staff training, skills and experience)? 
Decision Making: 
How are your decisions made? Is this decision making centralised or de-centralised?  
How are budgets maintained?  
How significant are sustainability issues in your role? 
